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The pharmaceutical industry spends roughly 15 billion dollars annually on detailing e providing gifts,
information, samples, trips, honoraria and other inducements e to physicians in order to encourage
them to prescribe their drugs. In response, several states in the United States adopted policies that
restrict detailing. Some states banned gifts from pharmaceutical companies to doctors, other states
simply required physicians to disclose the gifts they receive, while most states allowed unrestricted
detailing. We exploit this geographic variation to examine the relationship between gift regulation and
the diffusion of four newly marketed medications. Using a dataset that captures 189 million psychotropic
prescriptions written between 2005 and 2009, we find that uptake of new costly medications was
significantly lower in states with marketing regulation than in areas that allowed unrestricted phar-
maceutical marketing. In states with gift bans, we observed reductions in market shares ranging from
39% to 83%. Policies banning or restricting gifts were associated with the largest reductions in uptake.
Disclosure policies were associated with a significantly smaller reduction in prescribing than gift bans
and gift restrictions. In states that ban gift-giving, peer influence substituted for pharmaceutical detailing
when a relatively beneficial drug came to market and provided a less biased channel for physicians to
learn about new medications. Our work suggests that policies banning or limiting gifts from pharma-
ceutical representatives to doctors are likely to be more effective than disclosure policies alone.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Pharmaceutical companies invest heavily in marketing. Be-
tween 1990 and 2008, pharmaceutical expenditures on marketing
increased more than six-fold from $3 billion dollars to $20.5 billion
dollars (Congressional Budget Office, 2009). A practice commonly
known as detailing, in which drug company representatives make
sales calls to physicians and provide them with information, free
samples, meals, and gifts, accounted for the majority of promo-
tional expenses. Collectively, pharmaceutical companies spent
$15.7 billion dollars on detailing in 2011 or roughly $19,000 for
every physician in the United States (Kaiser Family Foundation,
2013; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013).
Amidst growing concern about potential conflicts of interests
generated by detailing, a host of states, medical schools, and in-
terest groups within the U.S. began to advocate for policies to
regulate interactions between physicians and pharmaceuticalKing), psb17@columbia.edurepresentatives (Gorlach and Pham-Kanter, 2013; King et al., 2013).
Efforts to transform the pharmaceutical industry have taken a va-
riety of forms ranging from self-regulation to laws prohibiting
physicians from receiving gifts. Academic medical centers have
implemented policies to limit interactions between students and
faculty and pharmaceutical representatives. States adopted laws
regulating interactions between pharmaceutical representatives
and physicians ranging from bans on gift giving to disclosure of gifts
and payments. Finally, the Physician Payments Sunshine Act re-
quires all drug manufacturers to publicly disclose financial re-
lationships with physicians including gifts and meals. Surprisingly,
little empirical research has examined the relative efficacy of these
various policies.
While one might think that regulation of detailing should have
obvious and strong effects on physician behavior, the canonical
expectation from social psychology is that disclosures and gift re-
strictions are unlikely to be effective (Dana and Loewenstein, 2003;
Sah and Fugh-Berman, 2013). Dana and Loewenstein argue, for
example, that “limiting gift size, educational initiatives, and
mandatory disclosure are unlikely to eliminate bias because they
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2003:254). Gift restrictions are thought to be ineffective because
even small gifts can create unconscious biases and disclosure can
producemoral licensing, which perversely increases bias. Given the
literature, it is not immediately obvious what effect, if any, regu-
lations will have on new drug diffusion.
Recent empirical research has found thatmedical school policies
limiting or prohibiting detailing lead to lower rates of new drug
uptake (King et al., 2013), higher rates of generic prescribing
(Epstein et al., 2013), and reduced off-label prescribing (Larkin
et al., 2014). While this work has significantly advanced our un-
derstanding about the impact of medical schools' conflict of interest
policies, three gaps remain in the existing literature. First, the
comparative efficacy of various policy strategies-gift bans, gift re-
strictions, and disclosure policies-has received little attention.
Second, it is unknownwhether policies implemented at the state or
federal level, rather than academic institutions, will be associated
with prescribing patterns. Academic institutions, unlike states,
have considerable control over detailer's access to providers and
substantial monitoring and enforcement capacity. Finally, prior
research has not examined whether physicians have and use
alternative mechanisms to learn about efficacious medications
when detailing is restricted. In places where detailing is limited or
prohibited, it is imperative that physicians have an alternative way
to learn about new effective medications. We address this issue by
examining whether physician peer networks acted as alternative
source of information about clinically advantageous medications
when restrictions on pharmaceutical detailing existed. Prior
research has found that peer networks influence physician pre-
scribing behavior (Coleman et al., 1957; Manchanda et al., 2008)
making network-based social learning a promising substitute for
marketing.
To preview our main findings, we show that policies banning,
limiting, and requiring disclosure of gifts to physicians were asso-
ciated with lower prescribing rates of newlymarketedmedications.
We observed significantly lower prescribing rates in states with gift
bans and gift limits, than in states that relied on non-public
disclosure alone. In states that ban gift-giving, peer influence
substituted for pharmaceutical detailing when a relatively advan-
tageous drug came to market.
1. Background
1.1. State level pharmaceutical marketing regulation
Eight states had adopted laws regulating pharmaceutical mar-
keting by 2009. These state laws can be divided into three cate-
gories: (1) states that required disclosure of payments and gifts to
physicians but do not limit or ban gifts, (2) states that required
companies to adopt and comply with codes of conduct developed
by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America,
which limits gifts, and (3) states with both statutory gift bans and
publicly available disclosure requirements (Gorlach and Pham-
Kanter, 2013).
Vermont, Massachusetts and Minnesota banned most gifts to
physicians and had the most comprehensive disclosure re-
quirements for non-prohibited payments. Gifts, according to Ver-
mont law, are defined as “anything of value provided for free to a
health care provider” (V.SA. 4361a). Minnesota introduced the first
state-level regulation prohibiting gifts in 1993. The legislation,
which remains among the most stringent in the United States,
banned gifts totaling $50 or more in a given year from a single
company. Similar legislation requiring mandatory reporting of
payments exceeding $25 was enacted by Vermont in 2002. This
legislationwas subsequently strengthened in 2009 to include a banon all gifts, including food, to health care professionals. In 2009,
Massachusetts implemented regulation restricting payments and
gifts and establishing a mandatory reporting requirement. Hono-
raria, consulting payments, clinical trials, research funding, sam-
ples, and educational materials are not considered gifts but must be
disclosed. Disclosure data are publicly available and identify indi-
vidual physicians.
Three statesdMaine, West Virginia, and Washington D.C.d
required pharmaceutical companies to report aggregated market-
ing expenditures to the state. Disclosure laws typically exempted
small gifts, reimbursements for clinical education, remuneration
for conducting clinical trials, and drug samples. Unlike data from
Minnesota, Vermont, and Massachusetts, the disclosure data from
these three states is not readily available via public websites.
California and Nevada mandated that pharmaceutical com-
panies adopt and comply with the guidelines developed by the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactures of America (PhRMA)
(National Conference of State Legislatures (2013); Gorlach and
Pham-Kanter, 2013). PhRMA's Code on Professional Interactions
with Health Care Professionals prohibits entertainment and recre-
ational items, as well as gifts not related to patient care or educa-
tion. The guidelines allow for meals accompanied by educational
presentations and discussions, as well as educational gifts of $100
or less per item. Payments or gifts that fall outside of the guidelines
do not have to be disclosed.
To examine how regulatory environments shaped drug diffusion
processes, we classified states by the strength of their regulation
and assigned them to one of four groups: (1) states with gift bans
and publicly available disclosure data, (2) states with codes of
conduct and gift restrictions, (3) states with disclosure re-
quirements, and (4) states without marketing regulation. Since
Massachusetts and Connecticut adopted regulation after the study
period, they are conservatively included in the set of states with “no
policy.”
1.2. Mental health medications
Mental health medications are currently among the best-selling
and most heavily marketed classes of drugs in the United States.
One in five adults in the United States received a mental health
medication in 2010. In that year, sales of antidepressant, antipsy-
chotic, and stimulant medications yielded close to $35 billion dol-
lars and accounted for 11.4% of U.S. spending on pharmaceuticals
(IMS Incorporated 2010). These three drug classes are also among
the top five most heavily detailed drug classes (Congressional
Budget Office, 2009). Given the importance of these classes of
medications to the pharmaceutical industry, our study focuses on
newly introduced mental health medications.
Newly introduced drugs are substantially more expensive than
the older alternatives and have contributed to both rising health
care costs, as well as pharmaceutical revenues (Duggan, 2005).
However, the majority of new drugs developed by pharmaceutical
companies are minor variations on existing medications that offer
few or no benefits over existing alternatives but often produce
significant adverse reactions (Light and Lexchin, 2012). Over 90
percent of newly approved drugs have been found by independent
assessors to offer no or minimal advantages over existing alterna-
tives (Light et al., 2013). Thus, to assess the true impact of phar-
maceutical marketing regulations, it is important to distinguish
between clinically superior medications and minor variations.
With respect to efficacy, the FDA simply requires medications to
be more efficacious than a placebo, even when effective drugs
already exists. It does not mandate that companies compare the
effectiveness of a newly introduced drug to existing alternatives in
what are known as head-to-head drug trials. Since head-to-head
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medication is necessitates compiling published and unpublished
studies and clinical trials for all existing drugs in the class to assess
relative drug efficacy, adverse events, and side effects. While the
drugs examined in this study vary in their level of clinical benefit,
none are radical breakthroughs in their class and all relied on active
ingredients already available on the market.
Our analysis focuses on four mental health medications intro-
duced during our study period: Vyvanse™ (stimulant), Invega™
(antipsychotic), Pristiq™ (antidepressant) and Cymbalta™ (antide-
pressant). Cymbalta was introduced four months prior to the begin-
ning of our dataset; all othermedicationswere introduced during the
study window. No other oral mental health medications were intro-
ducedduring thestudyperiod.Thesemedicationsare ideally suited to
studying new drug diffusion since they vary in how clinically bene-
ficial they are relative to existing alternatives within the class.
1.2.1. Vyvanse
Vyvanse is a stimulant used to treat attention-deficit/
hyperactivity disorder. While Vyvanse relies on active ingredients
that are already available on the market, the process by which it is
metabolized makes it less prone for abuse and longer-lasting than
other medications. The reduced potential for abuse is an important
development within the class since stimulants are among the most
commonly misused prescription medications. The Medical Letter, a
publication described by the then deputy editor of the New England
Journal of Medicine as producing “prescribing recommendations
that are free of pharmaceutical influence” (Zuccotti in Valentino,
2004), reported of Vyvanse that, it “has no euphoric effects if
given IV [intravenously] or taken intranasally and is thought to
have less potential for abuse than amphetamine itself. The duration
of action of lisdexamfetamine (Vyvanse) is longer than that of other
amphetamine preparations, which may be an advantage for use in
working adults.” Vyvanse's advantages over other medications in
its class have also been established in two meta-analyses that
synthesized the results of 32 (Roskell et al., 2014) and 28 clinical
trials (Stuhec et al., 2015), respectively. As Stuhec et al. (2015)
wrote, “The results suggest that lisdexamfetamine [Vyvanse] has
the best benefit risk balance and has promising potential for
treating children and adolescents with ADHD.”1.2.2. Cymbalta
Cymbalta (duloxetine) is a serotonin and norepinephrineTable 1
Characteristics of policies regulating pharmaceutical marketing activity by state. Policies
Disclosure
DC ME
Non-public Disclosure  
Statutory Gift Limits Based on PhRMA Code
Individual Payments to Physicians Publicly Available
Statutory Gift Ban
Table 2
Characteristics of medications introduced during the study period. The number of prescrip





Pristiq Antidepressant 2/2008reuptake inhibitor first approved to treat major depressive dis-
order in August of 2004. At the time of our study, it was the only
antidepressant approved by the FDA to treat neuropathic pain. In
June 2008, Cymbalta received an indication for treatment of Fi-
bromyalgia. Describing Cymbalta's utility for treating Fibromyal-
gia, The Medical Letterwrote it “appears to be effective in reducing
the symptoms of Fibromyalgia” and “has the advantage of once-
daily dosing and possibly adding effective treatment for depres-
sion, which is common in patients with fibromyalgia” (Medical
Letter 2008). A Cochrane Review of six trials that included 2200
participants found that Cymbalta was effective in treating both
Fibromyalgia and painful diabetic peripheral neuropathy (Lunn
et al., 2009). Pain and depression frequently co-occur with close
to half of patients with depression reporting that they experi-
enced some physical pain (Goesling, 2013). The ability to effec-
tively treat pain and Fibromyalgia are important advantages
Cymbalta has over other antidepressants.1.2.3. Pristiq and Invega
While Cymbalta and Vyvanse have advantages over existing
alternatives within their respective classes, Pritiq and Invega are
structurally similar to existing medications and offer little or no
known advantages. Both Pristiq and Invega are partially metab-
olized products of an existing drug. When a patient takes Invega, it
is metabolized into risperidone which is already generically
available. Similarly, Pristiq is converted into venlafaxine. As a
result, Pristiq was described in the Medical Letter as having “no
demonstrated clinical advantage over the parent compound.”
Similarly, Invega was found “to be similar to risperidone in
effectiveness and adverse effects.” Wyeth withdrew its applica-
tion for marketing authorization for Pristiq in the European Union
after concerns were expressed over its lack of efficacy and simi-
larity to venlafaxine. Pristiq is not approved for use in the E.U (see
Table 1).
As Table 2 summarizes, there were considerable differences in
the advantageousness of these four drugs. While all four are mental
health medications, they are not competitors since they treat
different underlying conditions. Vyvanse had less potential for
abuse than other stimulants and was also marketable to adults
because of its long-lasting formulation. With an indication for pain,
Cymbalta had a point of differentiation that was heavily marketed
to gain market share. In contrast, both Pristiq and Invega offered no
improvement over existing medications (see Table 3).in Massachusetts and Connecticut went into effect after our study period.
Gift Limit Gift Ban & Public
Disclosure





tions is the number of prescriptions written for themedication in the first 12months
er of prescriptions is the number of scripts written betweenmonths four and twelve.
Prescriptions Therapeutic Improvement
1,313,938 Indication for pain and Fibromyalgia.
1,195,185 Less potential for abuse. Longer acting.
170,623 Little or no improvement.
573,298 Little or no improvement.
Table 3
Negative binomial hurdle model of prescribing rates in the first year medicationwas
on the market. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Exponentiated co-
efficients. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
New Clinical Benefits Minor Variations
Vyvanse Cymbalta Invega Pristiq
Logistic
Gift Ban and Public Disclosure 0.52*** 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.17***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02)
Gift Restriction 0.66*** 0.63*** 0.69*** 0.71***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Disclosure 0.75*** 0.94 0.82* 0.75***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04)
Graduation Year 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.00* 1.01***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Volume of Competitor Drugs 1.08*** 1.05*** 1.02*** 1.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cash (%) 0.99*** 1.00*** 0.69** 1.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00)
Medicaid (%) 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.30*** 0.98***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00)
General Practitioner 0.89*** 0.98 0.47*** 1.41***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.010) (0.013)
Negative Binomial
Gift Ban and Public Disclosure 0.68*** 0.67*** 0.75 0.43***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.14) (0.06)
Gift Restriction 0.92** 0.91*** 1.18* 0.88***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.10) (0.03)
Disclosure 0.85*** 0.92 0.99 0.86
(0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.09)
Graduation Year 1.00*** 1.00 1.00* 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Volume of Competitor Drugs 1.03*** 1.02*** 1.01*** 1.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cash (%) 0.99*** 1.00*** 0.61 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00)
Medicaid (%) 1.00*** 1.00** 0.88 0.99**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00)
General Practitioner 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.50*** 0.84***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.02)
N Physician Months 3,733,755 2,359,576 1,614,599 3,982,415
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De-identified prescription data came from the IMS LifeLink™
LRx Longitudinal Prescription database. IMS obtains prescription
information from approximately 33,000 retail pharmacies, food
stores, independent pharmacies, as well as mass retailers. Over 60
percent of all prescriptions filled at retail outlets in the United
States are included in the LRx data. During our study period,
coverage of the LRx database ranged from 224,140,604 unique in-
dividuals who filled at least one prescription for any medication at
the beginning of the study period to 233,592,728 individuals at the
end of the study period.
We focus on the 47,607,531 patients who received at least one
prescription for an antidepressant, stimulant, or antipsychotic
medication between January 1, 2005 and April 30, 2009. Of central
interest is the prescribing behavior of the 916,338 physicians who
wrote at least one prescription for an antidepressant, antipsychotic,
or stimulant to one of these patients. The dataset captures at least
one prescription for 80% (916,338/1,144,790) of physicians in the
United States. The data is geographically representative and is
representative by sex, age, and insurance status; it has been used in
numerous publications within the medical literature (for examples
see King et al., 2013).
Each prescription record contains a unique prescriber identifi-
cation number, indicates how the prescription was paid for (Cash,
Medicaid or Third Party insurance), and includes the co-payment
for the prescription, the date dispensed, and the medication theprescription was written for. Using an encrypted prescriber iden-
tification number, it is possible to link prescriptions to information
about the physician including the three-digit zip code in which the
physician practiced, their specialty, the year they graduated medi-
cal school, and the medical school from which they received their
degree.
3. Analysis strategy
The first goal of our analysis was to determine whether patterns
of new drug uptake differed by drug across regulatory environ-
ments. To examine overall patterns of new drug penetration, we
plotted themarket share of each drug during the first year it was on
themarket. Market sharewas calculated by taking the total number
of prescriptions for the focal drug and dividing it by the total
number of prescriptions within that prescription drug class. Plots
were constructed for each regulatory environment (1) states
requiring disclosure, (2) states that limit gifts, (3) states that ban
gifts, and (4) states with no pharmaceutical regulation.
3.1. Regulatory environments
After descriptively examining prescribing rates by regulatory
regime, we estimated models examining the importance of
different types of regulation on provider prescribing behavior using
negative binomial hurdle models. A negative binomial hurdle is a
modified countmodel inwhich counts aremodeled in two stages. A
logit model governs whether a count is zero or a positive value. If
the zero hurdle is crossed and one or more prescriptions for the
drug of interest were written in the focal month, then a negative
binomial model is used. Using a hurdle model allows us to examine
whether peer influence and marketing restrictions are more
important when a physician is deciding whether to prescribe a drug
at all (logit stage) or making a decision about prescribing intensity
(negative binomial stage).
All models were estimated using physician-month as the unit of
analysis, so there is one observation for each physician in each
month a drug was prescribed within the focal medication class.
Providers were considered eligible to prescribe a newly introduced
medication and were included in our analysis if they wrote at least
one prescription within the class during the focal month. For
instance, a physician would be included in the Vyvanse analysis for
May 2007 if at least one stimulant was prescribed in that month,
regardless of what stimulant was prescribed.
Our analyses are limited to the first year eachmedicationwas on
the market. Since all of the medications were introduced at
different times, a four year window was necessary to capture the
first year each medicationwas on the market. Standard errors were
clustered by prescriber. Hurdle models only allow clustering on one
dimension. Since the correlations within prescriber are of the
greatest concern, we estimated models clustering by prescriber. As
a robustness check we also estimated models clustering by state,
which consistently produced smaller standard errors.
To examine the association between pharmaceutical regulation
and physician prescribing, we included three indicator variables for
policy typed(1) disclosure, (2) gift restriction, or (3) gift ban and
public disclosuredusing no policy as the reference category in our
models. Based on the existing literature, we also included several
physician characteristics as control variables: physician specialty,
year of graduation frommedical school, and insurance composition
of physicians' patients. The models include a general practitioner
indicator coded as “1” if the physician was a general practitioner
and “0” otherwise. Insurance compositionwas characterized by the
percent of patients with third-party insurance, which includes
Medicare, percent paying with cash, and percent of patients
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category, percent of patients with third-party insurance, was used
as the reference category. We also include the physicians' pre-
scribing volume of competitor drugs within the same class.
3.2. Peer influence
After establishing that prescribing patterns vary across regula-
tory environments, we wanted to examine whether peer influence
substituted for marketing. In places where detailing is limited or
prohibited, it is imperative that physicians have an alternative way
to learn about new effective medications. Peer influence in our
models is designed to capture peer-to-peer information sharing
and exclude the possible influence of key opinion leaders which are
another marketing tool used by pharmaceutical companies. We
anticipated that peer effects would be strongest for new medica-
tions with benefits over existing alternatives in states with strict
gift regulation.
To examine the importance of peer influence for each of the
medications, we included the lagged prescribing volume of physi-
cians who practice in the same three-digit zip code, attended the
same medical school, graduated in the same year, and are of the
same specialty as the focal physician. This was the most restrictive
definition of “peer” available given our data structure, but also
seems reasonable given the size of medical schools and the nature
of medical practice. Using this definition, roughly 8% of prescribers
had at least one peer. As we describe below, we also estimated our
models using an alternative measure of peers based on patient-
sharing networks to assess the validity of our proxy for peer
influence.
We assessed whether the importance of peer influence varied
by regulatory environment, by including interactions between the
policy variables and the volume of peer prescribing of the focal
drug in the previous period. Invega and Pristiq weremodeled solely
with logit models since 97.1% and 96.4% of doctors in a given month
wrote one or fewer prescriptions for these drugs, respectively. We
included peer prescribing volume of competitor drugs in all our
models. Finally, all models examining peer effects included the
physician's lagged prescription volume of the focal drug. Incorpo-
rating the lagged prescribing volume of the drug of interest helps
eliminate autocorrelation and takes into account that prescribing
volumes at tþ1 are likely a function of prescribing at time t. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by physician in the hurdle specifications
and by physician and state in logit specifications. Logit and negative
binomial models estimated with autoregressive error structures
produced similar results and are available upon request.
After examining how peer influence and state regulatory pol-
icies shaped physician prescribing decisions, we calculated the
predicted number of prescriptions written for each medication in
the first year the product was on the market. Using the margins
command in Stata, we generated predicted prescribing rates by
policy regime based on estimates from negative binomial models
for Vyvanse and Cymbalta and from logit models for Invega and
Pristiq. In order to examine the importance of peer effects in each
regulatory regime, we estimated predicted prescribing rates by
regulatory regime with no peer prescribing of the focal drug and
peer prescribing at one standard deviation above the mean pre-
scribing of the focal drug.We present graphs comparing states with
the most stringent marketing regulation to states without mar-
keting regulation.
3.3. Sensitivity analyses
Marketing regulation, which is central to our analysis, helps us
assess whether observed peers effects are being confounded bymarketing efforts. If we observe stronger peer effects in states that
limit pharmaceutical marketing, it is unlikely that our measure of
peer influence is simply capturing marketing efforts. Moreover,
including a lagged dependent variable (the prescribing rate of the
focal drug in the previous period) in our analyses acts as a control
for physician directed marketing since pharmaceutical companies
allocate detailing primarily based on previous physician prescribing
patterns.
To assess the adequacy of lagged prescribing volume as proxies
for pharmaceutical marketing efforts, we conducted several addi-
tional sensitivity analyses. First, we estimatedmodels with zip code
fixed effects to assess whether our estimates of peer effects, which
partially rely on co-location, could be capturing something that
constantly impacted all physicians in the area, such as a successful
detailer or key opinion leader. Models that included zip code fixed
effects were stratified by regulatory environment. We also esti-
mated models that included physician fixed effects to assess
whether our results could arise from detailers targeting physicians
who have a higher unobserved propensity to prescribe the focal
medication due to characteristics that do not change over time,
such as prior training or stable preferences, not captured in our
models. Models with zip code or physician fixed effects were esti-
mated using a negative binomial specification for Vyvanse and
Cymbalta and as logit models for Invega and Pristiq. To ensure that
our results are not capturing exposure to a time varying shock that
occurred in the zip code such as a conference or activity of a key
opinion leader, we generated simulated peers by randomly gener-
ating peers within three-digit zipcodes and re-estimated our
models Finally, we re-estimated our models with an alternate
measure of peers based on physician patient-sharing networks.
(See Supplementary Appendix).
4. Results
First, with respect to sheer uptake of new drugs, we observe that
prescribing rates of new medications were lower in states with
detailing regulations than in states without marketing regulations.
As shown in Fig. 1, prescribing rates for all four medications were
highest in states with no marketing regulation and lowest in states
that banned gifts to doctors.
4.1. Regulatory environments
Turning to the models examining regulatory strength and
prescribing rates, we find further evidence that prescribing rates
varied by state regulatory environment after controlling for
physician level characteristics. Physicians in states with gift bans
were 39%e83% less likely than their peers in non-regulated states
to prescribe newly marketed medications. Gift ban odds ratios
examining the likelihood that a physician would prescribe a new
medication ranged from 0.61 (95% C.I. 0.47e0.56) for Cymbalta to
0.17 (95% C.I. 0.14e0.21) for Pristiq. Physicians in states with gift
limits also had a lower propensity to prescribe than physicians in
states without marketing restrictions. The odds-ratios for gift
limits ranged from 0.63 (95% CI: 0.61e0.65) for Cymbalta to 0.71
(95% CI: 0.68e0.74) for Pristiq. Disclosure policies were associated
with a significantly smaller reduction in prescribing relative to
other types of regulation (OR Range: 0.75e0.94). For all four
medications the coefficient for disclosure policies was signifi-
cantly larger than the gift limit or gift ban coefficients (Wald-test:
p < 0.001).
Gift bans and restrictions were also associated with prescribing
intensity for the majority of medications were examined. Incidence
rate ratios in the negative binomial stage of the regression ranged
from 0.43 to 0.75 in states with gift bans and public disclosure. The
Fig. 1. Market shares of newly introduced medication during the first year on the market by regulatory environment.
M. King, P.S. Bearman / Social Science & Medicine 172 (2017) 153e162158insignificant and inconsistent coefficients for Invega in the negative
binomial stage are unsurprising given that less than three percent
of physicians wrote multiple prescriptions for Invega in a givenTable 4
Peer influence, marketing regulation, and physician prescribing of new medications. Al
payment composition, medical school graduation year, peer prescribing volume of comp
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struments to reduce prescribing levels of new medications (Wald-l models include controls for physician within class prescribing volume, physician




































Fig. 2. a. Predicted number of Cymbalta and Vyvanse prescriptions written in a year by an average physician practicing in different regulatory environments. Predicted prescribing
rates are shown without peer influence (grey) and with peer influence at one standard deviation above the mean (black). b. Predicted number of Invega and Pristiq prescriptions
written in a year by an average physician practicing in different regulatory environments. Predicted prescribing rates are shown without peer influence (grey) and with peer
influence at one standard deviation above the mean (black). Differences are not significant at p < 0.05.
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scribing volume for the majority of drugs we examined.4.2. Peer influence
In Table 4, which includes peer influence, we again see that the
odds of a physician prescribing a newly marketed medication were
lower in states with gift bans. Here, we also observe a significant
and positive coefficient for peer influence. For all medications
except Invega, physicians were more likely to prescribe a newly
marketedmedication if their peers had prescribed it in the previous
month. For clinically advantageous medications, peer influencewas
more important in states with gift bans than in states withoutmarketing regulation. The odds ratio for the interaction between
peer influence and gift bans for Cymbalta was 1.10 in the logistic
stage of the hurdle model and the incidence rate ratio was 1.05 in
the negative binomial stage. For Vyvanse, the interaction terms
between peer influence and gift bans were 1.11 and 1.07 in the logit
and negative binomial stages, respectively. Peer influence did not
vary by regulatory environment for Invega and Pristiq.
To investigate the clinical significance of these findings, we
generated predicted prescribing rates based on the models. As both
Fig. 2a and b shows, baseline prescribing rates for all four medi-
cations (shown in grey) were lower in states with gift bans than in
states with unrestricted pharmaceutical detailing. In the absence of
peer influence, physicians typically wrote 5.2 Cymbalta
M. King, P.S. Bearman / Social Science & Medicine 172 (2017) 153e162160prescriptions per year in states with gift bans and 9 prescriptions in
states without regulation. However, once peer influence is taken
into account (shown in black), physicians in states with gift bans
prescribed an estimated 10.2 Cymbalta prescriptions per year. High
levels of peer influence nearly doubled Cymbalta prescribing rates
in gift ban states. In contrast, the addition of peer influence in states
without marketing regulation had little impact on prescribing,
adding less than one prescription per year. We observed a similar
pattern for Vyvanse. In a world without peer influence, the average
physician in gift ban states would write 2.8 Vyvanse prescriptions
per year. This is considerably lower than the 5 prescriptions written
by physicians in states without detailing restrictions. However,
once peer influence is taken into account the prescribing rate of
physicians in states with gift bans rises to 4.3 prescriptions per year.
A much smaller and statistically insignificant increase in Vyvanse
prescribing was observed in states without marketing regulation.
While peer influence was associated with a significant and clini-
cally meaningful increase in prescribing rates of beneficial medi-
cations in states with marketing regulation, peer influence had no
meaningful impact on Pristiq or Invega prescribing rates.
4.3. Sensitivity analyses
Models incorporating physician fixed effects assuaged concerns
that targeting bias or other factors that do not change over time
might explain our results. With physician fixed effects, the peer
influence coefficient for Cymbalta was 1.08 (p < 0.001) and 1.15
(p < 0.01) for Vyvanse in states than ban gifts to physicians. Using
fixed effects, the peer influence variable for both Vyvanse and
Cymbalta increases in magnitude and becomes significant in states
with gift restrictions. In states with gift restrictions, the incidence
rate ratio was 1.14 (p < 0.01) for Vyvanse and 1.03 (p < 0.01) for
Cymbalta once physician fixed effects were included. Incorporating
three-digit zip code fixed effects also did not substantially alter our
results. Analyses of simulated peers further supported the notion
that our models are capturing peer influence, not capturing events
in the area such as conferences or promotional events. Models with
randomly matched physicians practicing in the same area did not
produce significant peer effects. While the main effects for gift
bans, gift restrictions, and disclosure were largely unchanged, the
interaction between peer influence and gift bans became insignif-
icant. Using randomly matched “peers” practicing in the same zip
code, the interaction between gift bans and peer learning was 1.01
(p ¼ 0.12) for Vyvanse and 1.02 (p ¼ 0.08) for Cymbalta. These
coefficients are much smaller than the coefficients in our primary
models and are statistically insignificant (See Supplementary
Appendix for models.).
Two additional factors increased our confidence in our results.
First, we observed elevated peer influence in areas with limited
marketing influence. Second, we only saw significant peer effects
for efficacious drugs. If homophily (which would manifest here as
the tendency of doctors with similar prescribing behavior to be
peers) accounted for the peer effects in our model, we would not
expect it to express itself only on efficacious medications. Any
alternative explanation of our results must simultaneously account
for the stronger expression of peer effects in areas with stringent
marketing regulation and only when the drug is efficacious.
Finally, our results are robust to alternate measures of physician
peers. Using patient-sharing networks to define peers, we found
results consistent with those reported above. The size of the
interaction term between peer influence and gift bans for Vyvanse,
however, was substantially larger when patient-sharing was used
to define peers. For Cymbalta, the interaction term was 1.10
(p ¼ 0.01) when proxying for peer networks and 1.13 (p ¼ 0.03)
when peer influence was defined based on patient-sharingnetworks. For Vyvanse, these coefficients were 2.08 (p ¼ 0.03)
when using patient-sharing networks and 1.11 (p < 0.001) when
using the peer proxy. This substantial difference in Vyvanse co-
efficients may arise from one doctor refilling a Vyvanse prescription
written by a peer for a shared patient. The coefficients for the
regulatory variables and baseline peer influence variables were
similar across both models for all medications. These results
increased our confidence that the measure of peer influence, which
relies on proximity, medical school attendance, and specialty, is a
reliable approximation of peer influence processes.
4.4. Causality, mechanisms, and alternative explanations
Since we do not have data on prescribing behavior pre- and
post-policy implementation, it is difficult to establish whether the
policy itself accounts for the observed association between regu-
latory environment and lower prescribing rates or whether there is
something different about these states that lead them to adopt
policies regulating pharmaceutical marketing activity and to have
lower prescribing rates irrespective of the policy. To rule out
competing explanations, we conducted three additional analyses.
First, we conducted a supplementary analysis that included an
indicator to examine prescribing behavior in Colorado. In 2006,
legislation that would have required andmade public disclosures of
payments to physicians passed both the state house and senate but
was vetoed by the Governor. If political climate or practice prefer-
ences accounted for the observed variation by regulatory envi-
ronment, we would anticipate lower rates of prescribing in
Colorado relative to states that had not passed marketing legisla-
tion. A robustness check found no evidence that this was the case:
the incidence rate ratio in Colorado for Vyvanse was 0.87 (95% C.I:
0.65, 1.15), Pristiq was 0.76 (95% C.I: 0.55, 1.04), Invega was 1.30
(95% C.I: 1.11, 1.52), and Cymbalta was 0.91 (0.80, 1.04). We were
also obtained additional data for antipsychotics for the period
following Vermont's strengthened marketing regulation, which
allowed us to observe prescribing rates of Invega prior to and after
the stronger policy took effect. A comparison of prescribing
behavior pre- and post-policy implementation is striking.
Following the enactment of a more stringent policy, which banned
all gifts, prescribing rates of Invega dropped by half and never
reached their previous levels. Finally, our results are robust to the
inclusion and exclusion of Massachusetts in the gift ban category in
2009.
Differences in market share across the different regulatory en-
vironments could potentially be explained by insurance formu-
laries and payer behavior. However, average copayments across
regulatory environments cannot explain our findings. Surprisingly,
copays in states with gift bans actually tend to be lower than copays
in states with weaker or no detailing regulation.
Finally, it is worth noting that the peer influence we observe
cannot simply be explained by key opinion leaders. Recall, that we
only observe elevated peer influence effects in states with gift bans.
Gift bans would apply to all physicians practicing in the state-
dincluding potential key opinion leaders. In addition, we control
for prescribing volume which is the primary metric used by phar-
maceutical companies to identify key opinion leaders. Any poten-
tial remaining effect of key opinion leaders would also be captured
in our analyses using simulated peers. We do not observe peer
influence when using randomly matched peers. Lastly, it seems
unlikely that pharmaceutical companies would only use key
opinion leaders to market efficacious medications. Rather, in a
world where key opinion leaders were driving the peer influence
effect, we would expect to see a significant effect for all medica-
tions. Collectively, this evidence suggests that the peer influencewe
observe comes from physicians sharing beneficial information
M. King, P.S. Bearman / Social Science & Medicine 172 (2017) 153e162 161about clinically advantageous drugswith other physicians, not from
paid key opinion leaders.
5. Discussion
A growing body of work suggests that detailing has a signifi-
cance influence on physician prescribing behavior (Fleischman
et al., 2016). This is why, of course, the pharmaceutical industry
spends billions of dollars a year on detailing. Our work finds that
regulatory regimes that curtail such largess turn out to benefit
consumers, since in the absence of gifts, dinners, honoraria, pens,
trips, free samples, and other inducements, physicians are less
likely to prescribe costly new medications that have few advan-
tages over existing alternatives. Instead, we find that when conflict
of interest policies restrict detailing, physicians turn to other phy-
sicians for advice about new drugs, select drugs that work and
ignore those that do not.
To curb the conflicts of interest generated by detailing, academic
medical centers, individual practices, hospitals, states, and nations
have enacted various policies including gift bans, gift restrictions,
and various forms of disclosure. Mounting evidence suggests that
medical school conflict of interest policies have a significant impact
on prescribing (King et al., 2013; Epstein et al., 2013; Larkin et al.,
2014). This work has also found that more restrictive policies
have a stronger effect on prescribing. However, little empirical
research has examined the relative efficacy of different types of
conflict of interest policies.
Our work extends previous research by comparing the impact of
different policies on prescribing rates. All three policy instruments
we examined were associated with reductions in prescribing.
However, we observe the largest reductions in prescribing in states
with ban gifts and gift restrictions. Disclosure policies that did not
reveal physicians' identities also reduced new drug uptake but
were less effective than other policy instruments. These findings
stand in contrast to previous work which suggests that gift-limits
and disclosure requirements are unlikely to be effective (Dana
and Loewenstein, 2003; Sah and Fugh-Berman, 2013). While our
work makes progress towards comparing the relative efficacy of
different policy mechanisms, we are unable to observe the full
range of policy options. For instance, we do not observe the effect of
public disclosure in isolation nor do we observe ironclad gift bans
that do not have exceptions for samples and the like.
Despite mounting evidence that policies restricting interactions
between pharmaceutical companies and physicians effect pre-
scribing behavior, whether these policies effect the quality of care
patients receive remains largely unknown. We help address this
gap in the literature by examining variations in prescribing rates of
medications that differ in clinical benefit. Marketing regulationwas
not associated with a simple reduction in prescribing for all med-
ications. For medications that did afford advantages over other
drugs already on the market, peer networks offered an alternative
means by which information about new drugs diffused when reg-
ulations were in place restricting gifts. In states where gift giving
was prohibited, the importance of peer influence was exacerbated.
Peer influence was of the greatest importance in states with gift
bans when an effective drug came to market. Thus, our workmakes
an additional contribution to the literature by demonstrating that
network-based social learning offers a less biased and more evi-
denced based mechanism for physicians to learn about new med-
ications. However, it is worth noting that none of the medications
we examined were radical breakthroughs. As a result, categoriza-
tion of the efficacy of the medications in this study is difficult.
Future work examining how marketing regulations effect the
diffusion of truly innovative new medications is needed.
Our study has several important limitations that we hope futureresearch will address. First, our study is limited in its ability to
establish causality. The recent enactment of new state level policies
and the Physician Payment Sunshine Act present valuable oppor-
tunities for future research to causally establish whether state and
federal policies lead to changes in physician prescribing patterns. In
addition, our data ends in 2009 so we cannot assess the effects
these policies or more recent policies have on current physician
prescribing. A second question our study has not addressed that
warrants further investigation is how these policies work to reduce
prescribing. For instance, do pharmaceutical companies reduce
marketing efforts when faced with regulation or are physicians less
likely to respond favorably to detailing when facedwith disclosure?
Finally, we do not have payments to individual physicians or
aggregated marketing data for all companies. Future work exam-
ining how payments to doctors and conflict of interest policies
affect patient outcomes and quality of care is needed. While
reducing conflicts of interest is a laudable goal, ultimately the
utility of these policies depends onwhether they can reduce health
care costs and improve patient outcomes.
Policymakers worldwide are searching for effective strategies to
manage conflicts of interest that arise from physician-industry in-
teractions. However, little empirical work exists to guide these
policy choices. While all of the policy instruments we examined
reduced physicians' propensity to prescribe newly marketed
medications, our work suggests that gift bans coupled with
mandatory public disclosure of exempt items are most effective at
reducing prescribing rates of newly marketed medications.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2016.11.010.
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